Working Papers
S. Diessner, C. A. Petit – Strengthening the Democratic Accountability of the EU’s New Industrial Policy through Parliamentary Oversight
EU industrial policymaking involves political choices and trade-offs with far-reaching distributive consequences. This working paper submits that EU industrial policymakers should be democratically accountable, particularly through oversight by the European Parliament over the European Commission, with input from the Council, Court of Auditors, and Economic and Social Committee.
Parliamentary oversight should be more stringent in areas marked by complexity and the need for democratic legitimation, both of which apply to EU industrial policy, especially in state aid control. To assess accountability, the working paper maps the activities of two key committees during the 9th legislative term (2019–2024): the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Our mapping of ITRE activities shows that its scrutiny of industrial policy is limited and needs strengthening. Additionally, there were no joint procedures with ECON, which could be improved. For ECON, oversight has been limited, with its main activity—an annual report on competition policy—not fully addressing the fast-evolving competition and state aid policy field.
Based on this assessment, the working paper introduces four recommendations to improve democratic accountability in EU industrial policy during the 10th parliamentary term (2024–2029):