

**LUISS** 

Research Center  
for European Analysis  
and Policy



Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
and International Cooperation



**Centres for European Policy Network**  
FREIBURG | BERLIN | PARIS | ROMA

## **Mapping the EU-Africa Trade Diplomacy through crises**

**Eleonora Poli, Andre Wolf and Rossella Boccia**

Policy Brief 10/2025

June 24, 2025

*This policy brief is realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant art 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The opinions contained in this policy brief are solely those of the panellists and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.*

## Mapping the EU-Africa Trade Diplomacy through crises

Eleonora Poli, Andre Wolf and Rossella Boccia

### Introduction

Being one of Europe's closest geographical neighbours, Africa plays a critical role within the European geopolitical and geoeconomic strategic maps.<sup>1</sup> Although Africa and Europe share many political and economic links, it was with the 1975 Lomé Convention that the mercantilist and imperialist approach exercised for years by Europe began to change.<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, the European Economic Community (EEC) aimed at moving beyond its colonialist past and spreading its foundational values of peace, economic and social progress, democracy, the rule of law and human rights across the rest of the world through instruments like external aid and trade.<sup>3</sup> In this respect, the Lomé Convention, which focused on trade relations and humanitarian aid, was the first attempt by Europe and Africa to develop equitable premises for building long lasting diplomatic and economic ties, which could mutually benefit both sides of the Mediterranean. In particular, the Lomé Convention allowed the European Economic Community to start developing a strategic partnership with the continent, ultimately becoming not only Africa's leading partner for security issues but also a trade and economic interlocutor in several strategic areas, including energy, the green transition and the digital transformation. The need for building mutually beneficial relations based on accountability and shared values became central within the rhetoric used by the EU and Africa in defining reciprocal relations, as highlighted in the joint Africa Union (AU)-European Union (EU) statement adopted at the 6th AU-EU Summit held in Dakar in 2022.<sup>4</sup> Yet, differences in national incomes, institutional development, as well as protection of civil rights, have certainly been impacting the way the EU-Africa relations evolved. At the same time, regional and global dynamics such as Africa pursuing ambitious economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), China's growing influence in the area or the US loss of interest in the European continent and the EU enlargement process have certainly favoured stronger European-African economic and strategic ties. In other words, while new international and global challenges have emerged, cooperation between Africa and the EU has rapidly developed and diversified. Yet, accounting for just 2.3% of world trade, only 3% of global GDP and just 2% of the EU's external trade, Africa still has a dependent position despite being home to 17% of the world's population. This trend has been contributing to an unbalanced playing field, whereby the EU, which is Africa's most important trading partner, has a highly asymmetrical position vis à vis Africa and its trade policies have greater impact on the continent than vice versa.<sup>5</sup> Against this backdrop, the aim of this policy brief is to map the evolution of trade relations between the EU and Africa since the early 2000s by considering the evolution of their relations amidst crises such as the 2008 financial downturn, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the current war in Ukraine, as well as the geopolitical changes that followed.

---

<sup>1</sup> European Council. (2025). [EU-Africa relations](#)

<sup>2</sup> CVCE (2017). [The Lomé Convention](#)

<sup>3</sup> Bossuyt J. (2017). [Can EU-Africa relations be deepened? A perspective on power relations, interests and incentives](#)

<sup>4</sup> Chitonge H. (2024). [Navigating partnerships: Analysing EU-Africa industrial policy relations - Africa Policy Research Institute \(APRI\)](#)

<sup>5</sup> Luke D. (2023). [Muddled priorities continue to plague EU-Africa trade policy - EUOPP](#)

## 1. EU-North Africa trade relations in the context of the 2008 financial crisis

Since the signing of the Lomé Convention, cooperation between Africa and Europe has focused on trade and aid relations. Yet, trade has mostly favoured Europe with little attention given to the industrial development in the African continent. Such an approach, at least formally, changed with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, which replaced the Lomé Convention. The Cotonou Agreement specifically mentioned the need to promote a competitive industrial sector in Africa, to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and promote sustainable economic growth.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, in 2007, the first draft of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), launched at the Lisbon's Africa-EU Summit, highlighted the parties' intent to move beyond a strategic donor-recipient relationship towards medium-long-term cooperation on jointly identified, mutual and complementary interests.<sup>7</sup>

Building on these privileged relations, before the 2008 financial crisis Africa enjoyed a high rate of economic growth thanks to a high global demand for commodities, rising capital inflows and foreign countries' direct investments, stimulated also by Chinese economic growth and by open international markets. While the crisis, which originated in a US financial bubble and soon spread globally, mainly impacted those few African countries that were relatively integrated in the international capital markets (e.g. South Africa, Mozambique and Kenya, among others), its effects on the real economy were felt in all African countries in the course of 2009. Indeed, even though Africa was less financially exposed than other regions, the financial crisis led to the loss of foreign investments and the fall of commodity prices, which in turn hindered African growth prospects.<sup>8</sup> For instance, the decrease in copper prices negatively impacted the value of Zambia's exports, while the fall in cotton exports resulted in Burkina Faso export growth passing from 6.9% in 2007 to 3.5% in 2008.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the financial crisis affected bilateral relations between African countries and international partners such as the EU. The economic downturn in Europe resulted in a reduction of official development assistance (ODA) and trade, although the EU negotiated several economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with many African countries.<sup>10</sup> Apart from the immediate effects of the global downturn, the general economic trend registered in Africa between 2003 and 2011 was positive, with the average GDP growing by 5.2%. Africa also had the youngest and fastest growing population in the world and its market integration and regional cooperation increased thanks to the development of the African Union.<sup>11</sup> Yet, in the same years, the EU changed as well. Enlargement towards Eastern Europe resulted in a bigger focus on internal institutional deepening and less on other neighbour regions, such as Africa.<sup>12</sup>

When it comes to trade relations, between 2004 and 2014 the EU, as a bloc, was consistently a net importer of goods from Africa (see Figure 1). This negative trade balance both concerned EU trade with the Sub-Saharan region and (with the exception of 2014) the countries in North Africa. This pattern persisted during the financial crisis, although EU imports declined more sharply than exports. Over the whole period, primary products played a dominant role in EU imports from Africa. Their share in total imports even markedly increased from 2005 to 2014. This dominance was also equally pronounced in trade with North Africa and the sub-Saharan region.

---

<sup>6</sup> Chitonge H. (2024). [Navigating partnerships: Analysing EU-Africa industrial policy relations](#)

<sup>7</sup> Brás Bernardino L. (2022). [A Strategic Partnership EU-AU. A joint vision for a common security](#)


<sup>8</sup> African Development Bank (2009). [Working Paper 96 - Impact of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis on Africa](#)

<sup>9</sup> African Development Bank (2009). [Financial crisis Impacts on Africa](#)


<sup>10</sup> Sanoussi B. (2010). Africa-EU Economic Relations in Light of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis

<sup>11</sup> Tralac. (2023). [The European Union and African Union Key Partners.](#)

<sup>12</sup> EU-Africa Summit. (2014) [EU-Africa relations](#)

**Figure 1: EU trade with African countries 2004-2014 in Billion USD**

Source: UN Comtrade (2025).

**Figure 2: Share of primary products in EU trade with Africa 2004-2014**

Source: UN Comtrade (2025).

## 2. EU-Africa Trade relations in the context of the Covid-19 Pandemic

In 2014, the EU was Africa's main export market (35% of exports), followed by intra-African trade (18%) and China (11%).<sup>13</sup> At the time, Africa's exports to the European Union (EU) continued to revolve mainly around food (51%), energy products and raw materials (49%).<sup>14</sup> However, trade trends varied across different regions of the African continent. In North Africa and the Mediterranean, the European Union was the main trading partner for both exports and imports. In sub-Saharan Africa, instead, China became the first trading partner, followed by the EU. For the EU as a bloc, Africa was the fourth largest trading partner after the United States, China and the United Kingdom.<sup>15</sup> This positive trend was certainly incentivized by several preferential trade agreements which allowed African exports to enter the EU market. Specifically, six Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were negotiated with 16 African countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,

<sup>13</sup> Eurostat (2014). [Africa-EU trade in goods](#)

<sup>14</sup> European Commission (2016). [EU trade policy and Africa's exports](#)

<sup>15</sup> European Commission (2019). [The European Union and Africa: Partners in Trade](#)

Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) as the two regional organisations.<sup>16</sup> The region, indeed, represents the EU's largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, many African countries benefit from the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which is widely recognised as the most progressive arrangement. GSPs can take three different forms. A standard GSP includes a partial or full removal of customs duties on two-thirds of tariff lines. The GSP+ provides special incentives for sustainable development and good governance. Finally, there is the EBA's scheme (Everything But Arms), which is benefitting 33 African countries by removing tariffs and quotas for all imports of goods (except arms and ammunition).<sup>17</sup> Through these preferential trade regimes, by 2020 the EU had again become Africa's biggest trading partner, accounting for 33% of its exports and 31% of its imports, with more than 90% of African exports allowed to freely enter the EU market.<sup>18</sup>

In particular, EPAs became central tools for the EU's Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, promoting sustainable development through enhanced trade relations, regional economic integration and the diversification of African exports.<sup>19</sup> Certainly the pandemic resulted in a global economic downturn, in the reduction of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and general foreign aid, as well as in the interruption of international value chains, with a consequent decrease of trade relations. Yet, in the case of Africa, already in 2019 there was a slight reduction of both exports and imports. In the case of European imports, this was mainly related to a reduction of the price of raw materials but also to the decreasing prices of oil and gas. Diminished exports were instead most probably caused by the depreciation of many national African currencies' vis à vis the euro. In 2021, EU exports of both primary and secondary products to Africa started to increase again, but were clearly outpaced by the strong growth of imports, which reached a peak in 2022. This is largely attributable to the strong increase in trade with fossil energy carriers reflecting the European energy crisis.<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, when it comes to EU-Africa relations, there were at least three positive outcomes of the pandemic. Firstly, the EU realized the need to support Africa in its own industrialization process. This became evident in the need for Africa to develop its own pharmaceutical industry to make vaccines and become more independent from the point of view of health production. At the same time, in response to the reduction of ODA as well as the regionalisation of trade, African regional integration was accelerated through the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was inspired by the EU's single market model.<sup>21</sup> Finally, the Global Gateways initiative, launched by the EU in 2021, was primarily developed around the need to boost trade relations with Africa in a more balanced manner. Indeed, the Global Gateway intends to boost Europe's green agenda, supports infrastructure development and enhances connectivity in various fields including digital technology, climate and energy, especially to face increasing competition from China and its Belt and Road Initiative, or the energy crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> European Commission (2021). [Economic Partnership Agreement with West Africa](#)

<sup>17</sup> The EBA scheme includes the following African countries: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Congo, Democratic Republic of Djibouti, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.

European Council (2025). [EU-Africa relations](#)


<sup>18</sup> Aza Finance (2020). [Africa-EU - International trade in Goods Performance](#)

<sup>19</sup> European Council (2025). [EU-Africa relations](#)


<sup>20</sup> Aza Finance (2020). [Africa-EU - International trade in Goods Performance](#)

<sup>21</sup> AfCFTA (2025). [Lessons from global RECs for the AfCFTA](#)

<sup>22</sup> Poli E. Wolf. A. (2024) [A Global Gateway to Secure Supply Chains?](#)

**Figure 3: EU trade with African countries 2015-2023 in Billion USD**

Source: UN Comtrade (2025).

**Figure 4: Share of primary products in EU trade with Africa 2015-2023**

Source: UN Comtrade (2025).

### 3. EU-African Trade Relations in the context of the war in Ukraine and an unsettled international arena

Beside the global economic downturn caused by the global pandemic, the EU remained Africa's top trading partner and its largest export market, while African countries together constituted the EU's fourth-largest trading partner, registering the largest trade surplus (55 billion in 2022). Building on such a positive trend, by 2022 trade in goods and services between the two continents had amounted to €504.3 billion euro.<sup>23</sup> Africa's trade surplus was largely based on mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials, which balanced the negative trends registered in the machinery and transport sectors. Such a trend became even more evident with the worsening of the war in Ukraine and the increasing cost of gas and oil. In this respect, it is not by chance that in 2023 Algeria and Morocco emerged as the leading exporters to the EU, mainly due to their

<sup>23</sup> European Council (2025). [EU-Africa relations](#)

capacity to export fuels and raw materials.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, however, the EU supported Africa through the complex economic shock caused by the war in Ukraine. The continent indeed was particularly vulnerable to the conflict, in comparison to other regions and countries, even closer ones, because of its dependence on imports for basic commodities such as fertilizer, grain, and fossil fuels.<sup>25</sup> Such a vulnerability left African national economies particularly exposed, resulting in an average increase of food prices of 23.9% from 2020 to 2022.<sup>26</sup> In particular, through the Food and Release Facility the EU sent around 1.5 million euro to help Africa, while the Global Gateway was implemented to support the development of local infrastructures, digital links as well as the green transition. The EU's aim was indeed to build close ties with Africa based on a mutual relationship, allowing Africa to benefit from this and to grow economically. As announced at the EU-AU (African Union) Summit on 17-18 February 2022, the EU intended to invest around 150 billion euro in the region, primarily through the Africa-Europe Investment Package to strengthen the digital system, develop a single digital market between Africa and Europe, and support renewable energies to increase climate resilience as well as electricity interconnections and transmission lines for creating the Africa Single Electricity Market (AfSEM).<sup>27</sup> As of February 2025, the Global Gateway featured 103 projects in Africa across five strategic sectors, namely the digital (20 projects), climate and energy (26 projects), transport (19 projects), education (13 project) and health (15 projects) (See Annex 3).<sup>28</sup> While the Global Gateway can play a pivotal role in keeping the bar high, when it comes to strengthening EU-Africa trade relations the war in Ukraine was a challenging factor, with African countries paying higher costs and the EU pressuring African governments to condemn Russia's aggression. In this respect, although EU-Africa relations seem to be on a good track, there is the need to keep political and economic dialogue open in order to seek out common positions that could equally benefit both parties. At the same time, the Global Gateway projects have to deliver real economic benefits both in Europe and in Africa, in particular by boosting local industrial and infrastructural development.

## Conclusion

In the last years, EU-Africa relations have seen a positive progression, marked by key milestones such as the Cotonou Agreement, the 2007 EU-Africa Strategy or the launch of the Global Gateway. Such a trend has certainly been stimulated by increasing competition from China, but also by a growing recognition of Africa's economic and trade potential for the EU, especially in the context of a more regionalized global market.<sup>29</sup> Certainly, EU-Africa relations remain a complex web of historical ties and political dynamics, in which the balance of power still largely favours European countries as major exporters to the continent. However, individual nations such as Morocco and Algeria are emerging as key players in the Mediterranean region, particularly due to their capacity to produce energy and export raw materials, highlighting the profound interdependence linking the two continents.<sup>30</sup>

In this framework, while the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential to position Africa as a strategic investment destination for European companies, the European Economic Partnership Agreements, Free Trade Agreements, and preferential schemes implemented with African countries can

---

<sup>24</sup> Dokua Sasu D. (2024). [EU-Africa trade - statistics and facts](#)

<sup>25</sup> Daniele Fattibene (2023). [Europe-Africa Relations in a Multi-Crises World: Turning the page after COVID-19, the EU-AU Summit and the war against Ukraine](#)

<sup>26</sup> Staeger U. (2024). [The war in Ukraine, the African Union, and African agency](#)

<sup>27</sup> Poli E. Wolf. A. (2024) [A Global Gateway to Secure Supply Chains?](#)

<sup>28</sup> European commission (2025). [Eu-Africa Flagship Projects](#)

<sup>29</sup> Business Europe (2022). [A more effective EU Trade Policy For Africa](#)

<sup>30</sup> Dokua Sasu D. (2024). [EU-Africa trade - statistics and facts](#)



significantly impact the continent's development. To date, the European Union is Africa's major trade partner, surpassing both the US, which has a trade agreement only with Morocco, and even China.<sup>31</sup> The EU should leverage this prominent position not only to boost its own interests but also to promote more sustainable and long-term development in the continent, which would provide a solid foundation for mutually beneficial partnerships. In particular, through the Global Gateway investments, the EU can diversify its market and make European trade relations more resilient to future crises. Moreover, this approach can create positive momentum for Africa not only as a profitable investment destination but also as a hub for long-term industrial development.

---

<sup>31</sup> European Commission (2016). [EU trade policy and Africa's exports](#)

## Annex 1- The Italian Mattei Plan for Africa

The Italian Plan for Africa, also known as Mattei Plan, reflects the ambition of the Italian government to regain a significant role in the African continent, while addressing issues related to irregular migration and energy security. While irregular migration has increasingly dominated the Italian political debate of the last 15 years, energy security became a priority after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the consequent interruption of natural gas supplies from Russia.<sup>32</sup>

The Plan was officially launched in 2023 by the current government led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni with Decree-Law No. 161 (later converted into Law No. 2/2024). The Law established the "Mattei Plan for the Development of African States", outlining the sectors of intervention and priority actions as well as a Steering Committee within Palazzo Chigi to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Plan and provide an annual report to Parliament.<sup>33</sup> The Mattei Plan was then presented at the Italia-Africa Summit, held in Rome in January 2024, together with representatives of 46 African countries, 25 multilateral organizations and top EU officials when it was made clear that the Italian ambition in Africa is to become a bridge between the opposite shores of the sea, increase cooperation with African countries and boost forms of sustainable development far from "predatory temptations" or a "charity-like" approach.<sup>34</sup>

The plan, which is set to be an open policy platform to continuously evolve in coordination with African countries' goals and needs, consists of six pillars, each corresponding to a sector of intervention: a) education and training, aimed at developing skills and expertise to build infrastructures (especially those relevant for the green transition) and strengthening coordination with African schools and curricula; b) health, whose main objective is to improve access and quality of primary services, especially for mothers and children, as well as developing strategies to prevent the effects of natural disasters and the spread of pandemics; c) agriculture, focused on making arable land workable and enhancing food security and food safety in Africa; d) water, aiming at improving access and management of drinkable water supplies; e) energy, with the goal of making Italy an energy hub for Europe while helping African countries interested in the initiative to produce energy for their own needs while exporting the excess to Europe; f) infrastructure, aiming at implementing and developing infrastructures in various sectors.<sup>35</sup>

To date, to implement the pillars outlined above, 21 projects have been identified—17 national and 4 regional and transnational projects. The national projects involve nine countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, and Tunisia. The regional and transnational projects also include Angola and Zambia, and remain open to participation from other African nations and the private sector.<sup>36</sup>

A total of €5.5 billion was allocated for the first phase of the Plan, spanning a four-year period from 2024 in the form of grants, credits, or guarantees to implement the Plan. These resources come from the National Climate Fund (€3 billion) and the development cooperation budget (€2.5 billion). Since it is still an ongoing

---

<sup>32</sup> Carbone G. & Ragazzi L. (2024). [Rebooting Italy's Africa Policy: Making the Mattei Plan Work](#). ISPI.

<sup>33</sup> [Dipartimento per il programma di Governo - Pubblicata in Gazzetta Ufficiale la legge n. 2 del 2024, recante disposizioni urgenti per il «Piano Mattei» per lo sviluppo in Stati del continente africano](#)

<sup>34</sup> [President Meloni's press conference introduction at the Italia-Africa Summit | www.governo.it](#)

<sup>35</sup> Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (2024). [Italia-Africa Mattei Plan 6 pillars](#)

<sup>36</sup> Senato della Repubblica (2024) [Relazione sullo stato di attuazione del Piano Mattei aggiornata al 10 ottobre 2024 - Doc. CCXXXIII, n. 1](#)

initiative, the first report on the state of implementation has identified two new financial instruments to support large-scale projects with sovereign partners. One such instrument is a multi-donor fund, known as the Mattei Plan and Rome Process Financing Facility, which will receive an initial contribution of €120 million from Italy. The fund is designed to attract additional international partners, with the United Arab Emirates already contributing \$25 million. In parallel, Italy has reactivated a bilateral fund in cooperation with the African Development Bank, with an initial contribution of €141.8 million from Italy.<sup>37</sup>

The Mattei Plan represents a concrete step in Italy's comprehensive and long-term strategy to strengthen cooperation with Africa. Its explicitly non-predatory approach seeks to establish equal and lasting partnerships based on local priorities and mutual growth. In this respect, the Plan aligns closely with the European Global Gateway, a strategic initiative aimed at bridging the global investment gap in education, health, energy, transport, digital infrastructures and research through transparent and mutually beneficial partnerships.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibidem

<sup>38</sup> European Commission (2021) [Global Gateway: up to €300 billion for the European Union's strategy to boost sustainable links around the world](#)

## Annex 2: list of trade agreements between the EU and African countries

Agreements ratified		
Country (Region)	Agreement	Status
<a href="#"><u>Egypt (North Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement</u></a>	Fully in force since 2004; modernisation discussions ongoing.
<a href="#"><u>Morocco (North Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement</u></a>	Fully in force since 2000; ongoing negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).
<a href="#"><u>Algeria (North Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement</u></a>	Fully in force since 2005; Algeria has expressed reservations about economic impacts.
<a href="#"><u>Botswana (SADC)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2016

<u>Eswatini (SADC)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>
<u>Lesotho (SADC)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>
<u>Mozambique (SADC)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2018</b>
<u>Namibia (SADC)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>
<u>South Africa (SADC)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>
<u>Ghana (West Africa)</u>	<u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>
<u>Côte d'Ivoire (West Africa)</u>	<u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Provisionally applied since 2016</b>

<a href="#"><u>Cameroon (Central Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2014
<a href="#"><u>Mauritius (Eastern and Southern Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2012
<a href="#"><u>Seychelles (Eastern and Southern Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2012
<a href="#"><u>Madagascar (Eastern and Southern Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2012
<a href="#"><u>Zimbabwe (Eastern and Southern Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2012
<a href="#"><u>Comoros (Eastern and Southern Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Provisionally applied since 2019
<a href="#"><u>Kenya (East Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Fully operational since 2024

<b>Agreements being adopted or ratified</b>		
<b>Country (Region)</b>	<b>Agreement pending</b>	<b>Status</b>
<a href="#"><u>Nigeria (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Negotiations ongoing; not signed
<a href="#"><u>Benin (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified
<a href="#"><u>Burkina Faso (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified
<a href="#"><u>Cape Verde (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified
<a href="#"><u>Côte d'Ivoire (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified
<a href="#"><u>Gambia (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified
<a href="#"><u>Ghana (West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	Signed, but non ratified

<a href="#"><u>Guinea(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Guinea Bissau(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Liberia(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Mauritania(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Mali(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Niger(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Senegal(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<a href="#"><u>Sierra Leone(West Africa)</u></a>	<a href="#"><u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u></a>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>



<u>Togo (West Africa)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<u>Senegal (West Africa)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Signed, but non ratified</b>
<u>Tanzania (East African Community)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Negotiations concluded in October 2014</b>
<u>Uganda (East African Community)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Negotiations concluded in October 2014</b>
<u>Burundi (East African Community)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Negotiations concluded in October 2014</b>
<u>Rwanda (East African Community)</u>	<u>Economic Partnership Agreement</u>	<b>Signed in September 2016, but has not ratified agreement</b>

### Annex 3: Global Gateways' projects in Africa

Digital		Climate and Energy		Transport		Education		Health	
Area/Country	Project	Area/Country	Project	Area/Country	Project	Area/Country	Project	Area/country	Project
Africa (regionale)	AfricaConnect4	Africa (regionale)	Climate adaptation and resilience	Marocco	Modernisation ONCF, tramway Rabat	Africa (regionale)	Youth Mobility for Africa	Africa (regionale)	Digital Health for UHC
Africa (regionale)	Medusa cable	Africa (regionale)	Private mobilisation fund for climate resilience	Tunisia	ELMED cable interconnection	Africa (regionale)	Regional Teachers Initiative	Africa (regionale)	Sexual & Reproductive Health (Sub-Saharan Africa)
Africa (regionale)	Africa-Europe Digital Regulators Partnership	Africa (regionale)	Energy Efficiency in Buildings	Egitto	Alexandria control center, railway line	Africa (regionale)	VET Toolbox 2	Nigeria, Uganda, Madagascar, Zambia	Safe Birth Project
Africa (regionale)	Data Governance	Marocco	Hydrogen power plant, methanol for shipping	Senegal	BRT Dakar, public transport Dakar, modular airports	Nigeria	TVET institutions in Benue, Plateau, Oyo	Rwanda, Sudafrica	MAV+: Vaccines and medicinal
Mauritania	Construction of data centre in Nouakchott and submarine cable	Marocco, Namibia, Argentina	Green Hydrogen project	Kenya	BRT Nairobi	Benin	Construction of professional schools	Burundi	Health System Support Program III (PASS III)
Nigeria	Support digitalisation	Tunisia	1.7 GW renewable energy programme, SouthH2Corridor, Medlink	Chad	N'Djamena Airport, Douala corridor	Angola	TVET/agricultural training	Ghana	MAV+: Vaccines and medicinal

Mozambique	VaMoz Digital	Algeria	SouthH2C corridor, Medlink	Capo Verde	Mindelo port	Zambia	Early childhood development	Senegal	MAV+: Vaccines and medicines
Etiopia	EU-Africa-India digital corridor	Egitto	Nexus approach, GREGY interconnection	Repubblica del Congo	Pointe-Noire port	Madagascar	Improving vocational education	Egitto	Healthcare access improvement
Djibouti	EU-Africa-India digital corridor	Senegal	Just Energy Transition Partnership	Cameroon	Yaoundé bypass			RDC	Drinking water infrastructure Mbuji Mayi
Tanzania	EU-Africa-India digital corridor	Sudafrica	Just Energy Transition Partnership, biogas project	Nigeria	Lagos water transport			Somalia	Rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure
Kenya	Construction of digital infrastructure	Nigeria	Solar mini-grids, combi-tracks solar + agriculture	Angola	Road EN140			Kenya	Mwache water project
Somalia	Somalia connectivity expansion	Zambia	Kolwezi-Solwezi Interconnector	Guinea Bissau	Bissau-Safim road				
RDC, Zambia, Zim, Malawi, Moz	Construction of fiber-optic backbone	Namibia	Green hydrogen platforms	Benin	Strategic road corridors				
Madagascar	Investing in mobile networks	Kenya	Olkaria geothermal, biogas transfer	RDC	Investment in Lobito Corridor				

Sudafrica	Time Synchronization System	Gambia	Access to energy	Zambia	ZTK Interconnector				
		Angola	Solar park	Tanzania	ZTK Interconnector				
		Ghana	Solar Kaleo, Bauxite project	Mozambique	Lobito Corridor investment				
		Benin	Photovoltaic minigrids (WAPP)						
		Madagascar	Renewable energy production increase						
		Rwanda, Burundi, RDC	Ruzizi III hydropower plant						
		Mozambique	Hydropower modernization						
		Zimbabwe	Rehabilitation of Kariba Dam						

Source: European Commission (2025)<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> European commission (2025). [Eu-Africa Flagship Projects](#)