Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung

Das IMK ist ein Institut der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung

## PRODUCTIVITY IN GERMANY: RECENT TRENDS AND OUTLOOK

OFCE/LEAP Workshop: (Missing) Productivity and the Growth Challenge, Panel: Europe facing an Existential Challenge


Prof. Dr. Sebastian Dullien


Paris, May 25, 2025

### German productivity: A long-term decline in line with OECD trends

- Productivity growth has declined in all OECD countries since the 1970s
- Germany has followed the trend
- Extremely weak productivity growth since Covid (only partly in the graph)

Productivity (output per hour worked), annual change in %








#### **German productivity in detail**

- Since 2020, productivity growth has been on average around 1 % annually
- Since 2022, there has been no productivity growth (and negative growth in 2023 and 2024)



Annual productivity change (output per hour worked), in %




## Specific reasons for weak German productivity growth

- Beyond traditional explanations (R&D, structural impediments,...), there are a number of very specific factors for the German productivity weakness in recent years
  - Persistent underinvestment in public infrastructure
  - Manufacturing crisis
    - Labour hording
  - Decarbonisation investment and obsolosence of nondepreciated capital stock
  - Large inflow of (relatively uneducated) foreigners
    - From 2013 to 2024, population with foreign passport increased from 7.6 million to 14.1 million
    - Largest group of newcomers: Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan



#### The German government has not invested much for 30 years





Elsenbrücke, Berlin


MACROBOND



## Statistical decomposition of German productivity growth

Since 2020:

- Low TFP growth
- Negative non-ICT capital deepening



Contributions to productivity growth in Germany

Source: IMK – Herzog-Stein/Stein (2025)




#### What does that mean for the future?

- German government has just changed the debt-brake in the constitution
  - Increased debt-financed spending for defense
  - Increased debt capacity for federal Länder
  - Additional €500 bn debt capacity for public investment
- There are still question marks about compatibility with EU fiscal rules, but government plans to ramp up spending
- One-off effects might also dissipate

## What does that mean for productivity

- Public investment increases public capital stock
- Simulation with NiGEM with two different production functions
  - Public capital as substitute for private capital (standard)  $Y_t = A_tF(K_t,E_tL_t)$
  - Public capital as additional production factor  $Y_t = A_t K_{P,t}^{\alpha} (E_t L_t)^{1-\alpha} K_{G,t}^{\theta}$
- Result: Productivity increases by up to 6 %
  - Equivalent of 0.3 percentage points productivity growth per year





### **Conclusions**

- German productivity growth has been weak...
- ...but beyond factors widely discussed and similar across the EU (R&D spending, low startup dynamic), there are some one-offs and specific German factors
- There is hope that productivity growth picks up once these factors dissipate



# **THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!**

